The following is the text of a speech by the Rt Hon The
Lord Goldmith QC, British Attorney General,
Distinguished guests..... Ladies and Gentlemen
You have, in fact, demonstrated the most delightful disregard for history
in inviting me to speak here in
I would like to thank Judge Becker for his introduction and for reminding
me of John Lennon and my real claim to fame.
But no true lawyer could fail to rejoice to be in
And for its unbreakable connection with the Declaration of Independence
Philadelphia is also a more than fitting place to celebrate Magna Carta, and our
great shared legal and political heritage. For
McLeish was right to say that the Declaration of Independence was a part of a
political and legal tradition that unites British and American peoples.
Thomas Jefferson would have agreed. For
he described his Declaration as "the Magna Carta of a new continent".
Indeed, the fact that it was in
The law in which the American founding fathers then had confidence was
English common law, brought with the settlers as part of their culture and
adapted to suit the economic and social conditions of the colonies.
English legal texts were for long of great importance because there were
few indigenous legal texts and no published case reports in the colonies until
after independence. When Sir
William Blackstone published his Commentaries on the Laws of England in the 1
Magna Carta itself played a major role in the development of the
constitutional thinking in
And just as the Declaration of Independence provided inspiration for the
gre
And so whenever a free man or woman in the English speaking world rises to
boast of our freedom or to warn off those who would assail it; it is the name of
Magna Carta which comes first to their tongue.
But, it is not only the love of liberty and freedom that shows our common
legal heritage. In all areas of the
law and legal relations we can find that common heritage, from the laws of
contract and tort, through property law and relations between family members, in
all these areas we share a common heritage. True that there have developed many
differences between our systems. The common law was adapted to meet the
different economic and social conditions of the colonies - such as the fact that
the abundance and size of the land meant that America had a far higher
proportion of people owning some land than in England and therefore a greater
interest in legal services of the kind that the middle class are used to: deeds
and wills, laws of property, mortgages and contracts for debt.
And being larger and more decentralized with no central body which could
impose a single uniform standard the law here developed in different ways.
Many of the developments were good and would come back, as I shall want
to demonstrate, to fertilise the native legal soil of
But though these differences be marked, they should not obscure the
unifying principles and features that flow through both our sets of laws:
that each has the right to own property and enjoy the fruits of his
labour, that contracts made in fair dealing and giving effect to the reasonable
expectations of reasonable men should be honoured and, where necessary,
enforced; and that those who inflict unjustified harm on others or on the
community may be required to pay compensation or make good the loss; that the
family is entitled to protection by society and the State and that the welfare
of children deserves special protection; and that we embrace the ideal of
democratic government under the law, protecting freedom of speech and thought
and respecting personal autonomy. We
perceive the same basic values; we respect the same basic rights; and give
effect to them through a shared common law heritage which, while different and
diverse in its detailed elements, as we rejoice in the difference of our
diversity, is founded on some basic and fundamental principles.
We have a common bond and the common law is glue of that bond.
The extent to which we share common principles and our laws relating to
each other was demonstrated in a remarkable series of essays by
It may be objected that we share these values and principles too with
others who do not come from the common law tradition.
And up to point I would not disagree.
And growing international standards and norms of behaviour and respect
for human rights promise to bring the world closer together in many different
ways. But much as I admire, for
example, the elegance of the civil
law traditions of Europe with its carefully created codes and administrative
safeguards and much as I respect the
differing legal traditions of other cultures further afield, I still see some
special features of the common law which bind us together especially close.
How does one single out the features of such a rich and varied system of
law to illustrate its soul and its distinctness?
Is it the value we attach in our democracies to the freedom of expression
-guaranteed by the First Amendment? A
principle which promotes the self fulfilment of individuals and enables the
truth to emerge from the free expression of conflicting views through the route
so memorably explained by Justice Holmes more than 80 years ago when echoing
John Stuart Mill he declared that "the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Is it the value of equality reflected in the stirring language of the 14th
Amendment that the State should not "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"? Or yet some core principles
that I have mentioned before which protect the right to own property, or to have
free and fairly engaged contracts to be enforced protecting us from unjustified
harm from our neighbours.
I believe a fair claim could be made for all of these.
But I prefer to focus on another: the role of law and lawyers and of
judges in both our countries.
First the rule of law and due process of law.
Is that not the very basis of our free society.
That no-one, government, corporation or individual is above the law.
Lord Denning, one of our most famous modern and most innovative judges
said this; "Be you never so
high, the law is above you." Every
citizen and person in the land, I would suggest, feels that this is the basis of
society; that there can be no interference with our liberties, no imposition on
us made, without the authority of the law and only in accordance with the
requirements of the law. Coke in his
Institutes interpreted those words "the law of the land" and "due
process of law" in this way "Every oppression against law, by colour
of any usurped authority is a kind of destruction and it is the worst oppression
that is done by the colour of justice."
Today's citizen might say simply to a policeman or civil servant
"Who says you can do that? By
what authority?" Very different language but the meaning is the same; the
citizen feels now as part of our culture what Coke meant.
The same is not always true of other cultures where one's rights are
simply what the State allows and not, as we have come to know all rights except
those limited by properly enacted law.
Secondly, the role of judges and lawyers.
My hypothetical citizen would have gone on to say "And if you can't
show me the authority, I'm going to take you to Court."
I believe that it would now be almost universally recognised throughout
the world that protection of the rule of law requires that the law be applied by
an independent impartial tribunal. So
much is guaranteed by many international and regional conventions and national
constitutions. So the common law is
not unique in insisting on the impartial administration of justice.
But it has a tradition in the type of persons chosen to be judges,
typically distinguished and experienced practitioners of the law rather than
specially trained and appointed career magistrates as in many other countries
and a technique for adjudication which is special to the common law.
Unlike the civilian law system' s reliance on the careful compilation of
codes of law the common law has relied instead on an incremental process of
development based on the precedent value of judge made law.
The law is developed through the decisions in individual cases, the
reasoning in each case often fully spelled out, proceeding by analogy on a case
- by – case basis, striving to find the principle to be derived from earlier
cases, each case potentially acting as a precedent both for other cases of the
same type and for other cases which follow in a different but analogous area.
This is the source of its enduring strength.
In all legal systems the enduring tension - the constant duality - is
between the necessity for stable predictable rules and the universal desire for
justice in each individual case. The
common law seeks to accommodate the duality at the outset, developing its rules
case by case so that gradually and over time general principles do emerge.
Thus the judges concentrate on the attainment of justice, anchoring their
decisions in custom and experience. I
think that’s why it has been said that "the lifeblood of the law is
experience not logic".
This process means that the judges in common law countries acquire and use
the same tools of legal reasoning and deduction: finding the ratio or central
principle of the case, recognising points of distinction and reconciling
apparently incompatible decisions. Again
the common lawyers do not have a monopoly of these skills but in a system where
precedent is the code and not a decision of a court, they are not of the same
value or importance.
It is these shared skills that mean that we continue to influence and
shape each other's legal systems. Though
we have not shared a common court for over 200 years our law continues to be
cross pollinated by each other as judges, lawyers and scholars draw inspiration
and help from decisions in another common law court.
The cases in which the US Supreme Court, for example, has returned the
compliment of the value US law has had from English decisions are legion: in our
developing law of privacy for example where our highest courts have drawn
heavily on decisions such as City of Chicago against Tribune and New York Times
against Sullivan; in the field of economic loss by negligently performed
professional services where the
House of Lords found much help in the seminal judgements of the great Justice
Cardozo in Ultramares v Touche and Glanzer v Shepherd (and interesting to note
the House of Lords decision itself was then itself referred to by the Court of
Appeals of New York - and so the process of cross pollination continues); and
particularly in the field of judicial review of administrative action where we
have borrowed heavily and lately to pursue what is now a robust and effective
system for controlling the Executive to what the law allows.
There is a third feature to which this process gives birth.
It is in my view the genius of the common law: to be able to develop as
society develops and as social and economic conditions change.
The common law is flexible precisely because it does enable new
situations to be fitted into the old law through this process of reasoning by
analogy on a case by case basis. Many changes are too great for judges alone to
accommodate. But the judges can
allow change gradually to occur. Consider
for example how our laws of equality have been adapted to meet new
differentiations and demands by our citizens; or the laws of tort to meet the
new ways of causing damage on a massive scale that first industrialisation and
later newer technology could bring.
So as we turn to consider the challenges of our present days and the years
that lie ahead, this flexibility of the common law, this ability to adapt to
meet the changing circumstances, this genius for balancing in a just and
proportionate way the competing rights of different interest groups, is one of
the treasured assets that our tradition gives us.
For the
11 September was a heinous attack not just on the
In dealing with the post-11 September threat that faces us both, we are
very conscious of the tension between the needs of national security and the
duty of the state to protect its people, on the one hand, and the right to
individual liberty, on the other. The
dilemma, or rather the challenge, is to ensure the protection of society and our
national security, while not abandoning the very values which we are fighting to
protect.
We have had to confront these issues in the
But one of the more controversial steps relates to the treatment of
persons within the country who have no immigration right to remain and who are
suspected of involvement in terrorism and pose a threat to national security.
In relation to these persons we have a special difficulty.
Under our immigration law we have the right to deport them because they
have no right to be in the country but we are prevented from carrying out the
deportation because of our obligations under international law, notably, the
European Convention of Human Rights to which we have adhered for many years and
which has recently became a part of our domestic law.
Where they would face death, torture or inhuman and degrading treatment
if returned to their country of origin, these obligations prevent us sending
them back. So we are faced with a
choice: either to leave them to roam free in the country - an unacceptable risk
in the light of September 11th - or to detain them unless they will
voluntarily leave the country.
And our solution has been to arrange for full judicial scrutiny by a
special body, the Special Immigration Appeal Commission.
This body is able to hear part of the evidence behind closed doors and so
avoid our security risks. But the
process is so fashioned that it meets the needs of the difficult situation while
committing fully to our traditional views of the rule of law.
The Commission is constituted as a court of record with a right of appeal
on a point of law to our Court of Appeal. It
is presided over by a senior judge; and although certain material cannot be
disclosed to the defence (although much is) it does not go without being tested.
A special advocate is instructed who is provided with all the material
and is given the job of testing it rigorously before the Commission, albeit in
closed session
There is thus full judicial scrutiny, adapting only where essential
because of our other legitimate concerns not to compromise the safety of our
agents or of the British people. I
believe that our commitment to the rule of law in which the lawfulness of
executive action is tested is evident.
Indeed there is a key court challenge taking place later this month in
which I will personally put the Government case to test if these powers are
compatible with our obligations under international law.
This issue upholds and illustrates the balance that we have to strike. I
think that we have struck it right and certainly that it is justified to place
these restrictions on liberty of a few individuals in respect of whom there is
well grounded suspicion of connection with terrorism.
But it also illustrates that it is possible to strike that balance by
adapting the precise rules of the traditional common law approach to meet the
strong demands of the moment. The
flexibility of the common law to enable effect to be given to the statutory
scheme is key. Of course, the civil
rights against security issues is an even bigger one here in the
So the need to consider that balance raises an issue which the common law
has always had to grapple with: how to deal with the different interests of
different groups. These can
increasingly be posed in terms also of a clash between different rights. We have
long accepted that few rights are absolute and that the exercise of them may
require to be balanced against the rights of others the interests of the
community as a whole or indeed against other rights.
Freedom of expression and privacy, for example, are two sides of a coin;
one man's freedom of expression to say what he likes about someone else
interferes with that another's right to privacy. Governments have always had to
weigh the risks to the many of the few. But
the chilling modern techniques of terror - the inhuman use of aeroplanes and
innocent people as bombs - or the evil evil targeting of commuters or office
workers without warning - places a clear responsibility on government to act.
To balance the right, if you will of the individual from arrest or
detention against the right of the innocent man woman or child to protection
from sudden death or maiming and their families from the cruel loss of their
loved ones.
So In conclusion, I thank you for listening to me and doing me the honour
of attending here. I just like to underline the closeness of the British and
American peoples. It is a closeness
which we can measure in the centuries from the fields of